# 1AC

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#### **We begin with the story of Mohammad Sarwar. Mohammed Sedique explains in the 1996:**

Sedique, ’96 [Mohammed Sedique, demining survey team leader in Afghanistan. “Stories of Landmine Victims”, Huamn Rights Solidarity, http://www.hrsolidarity.net/mainfile.php/1996vol06no01/110/]

In a letter to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, de-miner Mohammad Sedique tells the story of 10-year-old Mohammad Sarwar who lost his legs in a landmine explosion. Mr. Sedique is the survey team leader of team No. 10 of the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA) in Afghanistan. Here is Mr. Sedique’s letter.

When I was busy surveying a mined area at Tapa Salam area of Kabul city in September 1995, I saw a disabled child walking with the help of sticks towards us. I stopped work and went to see him and to know the reason of his disability. When greeting, I noticed that he had lost both of his legs and walked with a prosthesis.

He introduced himself as Mohammad Sarwar, 10 years old. When asked about the reason of his disability, he replied after a pause and with a dull voice:

"We left our house," he said pointing towards a house near the minefield that we were surveying, "when fighting started early this year. A few months back when the situation seemed to be peaceful, we returned back to our destroyed house. I hoped that we will again have a happy life and I will again play with my friends. Our house had been destroyed and we had to face many problems. There was no water so we had to bring it from a distance. My mom asked me to bring some water and I picked up the pails and left the house.

"When heading towards the well, I heard a thunder-like sound and saw a flash of fire before my eyes. It was only after a few hours when I opened my eyes and I found myself at the hospital and I saw my mom standing and crying beside my bed. Only then I found that I had fallen victim to a mine and that I had lost both of my legs. I was a student of class four at Mir Ahamd Shaheed School in Dehmazang, but I will no longer be able to continue my education as I cannot walk to school."

Mohammad Sarwar also mentioned the story of one of his classmates who had fallen victim to a mine blast at the same area.

"I cannot enjoy my life and I cannot play with my friends any more. I miss all the happy times at the school and at the playgrounds with my friends. I have to live a terrible life. I wish you had come here to clear mines before I lost my legs."

#### Sarwar’s story is not an abnormality – landmines are responsible for 26,000 casualties a year and ongoing structural violence

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Landmines are among the most deadly weapons in the contemporary world. These weapons have killed more people than nuclear, chemical and biological weapons combined and their development and produc- tion is significantly cheaper. The price to produce a mine generally ranges from US $3 to US $30 per mine (Beier and Crosby 1998: 280). Although it is difficult to assess the precise figures of casualties from landmines (Maslen 2004: 27), the ICRC has estimated that every year 26,000 peo- ple are wounded or killed by landmines, including many civilians (ICRC 1996). Many victims are not included in any data, as the recording of victims relies on them being able to access medical care, which for many is out of reach. Shocking data exists from the most heavily mined countries. Cambodia, for example, recorded more than 54,000 people maimed or killed by mines or unexploded ordnances (UXOs) between 1979 and 2002. Or, as recorded by the Vietnamese Minister of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs in September 1999 ’at least 38,248 people had been killed and 64,064 people injured in landmine/UXO accidents since the end of the Vietnam War in April 1975 - indicting an average of 4448 deaths of injuries a year’ (Maslen 2004: 28). While the majority of victims of anti-personnel mines during actual conflict are men; children and women are disproportionately affected by mines and UXOs follow- ing the cessation of conflict.

Among the countries most affected by mines are some of the World’s poorest with exact estimates difficult to make. The landmines campaign decided at a meeting in Montreux, Switzerland, in 1993 that the figure they would deal with would be 100 million mines. In the same year, the US Department of State published a report Called Hidden Killers that supported the campaign’s claim by estimating that between 65 and 110 million mines were hidden in more that 65 countries. The Department of State Report and the UN Secretariat to the General Assembly took on this figure as a reference point. The figure ’has been widely used and reused, a mantra that for several years became an uncontested reality, a compel- ling call to action’ (Maslen 2004: 24). In 1998, the US State Department stated that ’between 85 million and 90 million landmines are currently implanted in the soil of at least 62 nations’ (US State Department 1998, in Vines 1998: 121). It became obvious that the figures Were highly inaccurate, relying mainly on data and estimations provided by affected countries interested in inflating the numbers to claim higher funding for mine clearance. 'As time Went on, even some of those heading the cam- paigns against anti-personnel mines began to realise that the figure of 100 million was inflated, and probably grossly inflated. Yet the decision was taken, rather disingenuously, to remain silent’ (Maslen 2004: 25).

No accurate data exists even today. Where several governments, NGOs as well as the UN General Assembly acknowledge that the figure of 100 million is wrong, there remains no indication from reliable sources as to the extent of this inaccuracy. This, nevertheless, does not downsize the problem that explosive devices cause when lying forgotten in the soil. As Maslen (2004: 25) puts it:

Yet - and here is the grain of truth that remained obscured - although the 100 million figure for mines appears to have been widely inaccu- rate, the overall global problem of explosive remnants of wars surely surpasses it. No one knows how many abandoned or unexploded bombs, grenades, shells and rockets pollute the earth’s surface, but the figure is certainly gigantic.

The variety of mines ranges from small blast mines that explode by foot Contact to so-called butterfly mines that look like toys. In order to explode they must be bent or twisted. The injuries caused also differ between types of mines: While some are designed to affect the lower part of body such as legs and genitals, others are designed to kill everything radius (see Cameron et al. 1998: Zi).

The construction of anti-personnel (AP) mines is intended with the aim of maiming rather than killing their victims. ’The reason behind this lies in the macabre logics of the battlefield; it requires more effort to care for an injured soldier than for an already dead one’ (2007: 60) In addition to causing physical harm, mines cause emotional harm to their victims. Examples are the so-Called lifelong phantom pain for the victims or amputations resulting in low self-esteem and/or depression. in addition to the personal costs to the victims and their families and friends, landmines cause socio-economic costs that are just as severe. Landmines destroy life and habitat. Years after a crisis or War, Crucial agricultural and living spaces remain mined and therefore leave civilians unable to return to their routines (Wisotzki and Müller 1997).

Furthermore, because of the proliferation of low-intensity warfare since the 1975 the usage of AP mines has increased. Being cheap and easily available to governments as well as guerrilla troops alike, mines, next to automatic rifles, became 'the Weapon of choice’ for both (Vines 1998: 120). Demining is difficult, time consuming, dangerous and costly. According to Wisotzki and Müller, one can buy a cheap plastic mine for no more than US $3 While the removal of one costs between US $300 and US $1000. While demining technology exists, humanitar- ian demining remains the only sufficient method for declaring areas safe. Companies that use or produce landmines are among those who produce the technology for demining. Partly they even receive govern- mental funding for the development of demining techniques. ’In 1996, for example, Westinghouse and Raytheon, the latter being a major producer of AP mines, competed for US Department of Defence con- tracts worth between US $40 million and US $50 million for research and development in the area of airborne detection systems’ (Beier and Crosby 1998: 282). UN standards ask for a clearance rate of 99.6 per cent While mine technology is not able to consistently destroy more than eight mines out of ten (Hubert 1998: 314).

### 1AC human security

#### PLAN: The United States federal government should ratify the Mine Ban Treaty to prohibit the introduction of anti-personnel landmines into hostilities.

#### Ratifying the Ottawa convention protects victims of landmines and affirms the value of human security in international law

**Holbrook 09** (Trevor Holbrook, MA, International Relations, Weber University, Thailand, “U.S. Policy Recommendation: Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines,” American University, Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Brief, No. 17, 2009)

This article examines the consequences of the U.S. refusal to sign the Ottawa Convention and examines the implications of its continued refusal for the Ottawa Convention and customary international law. The United States has historically been a global leader and advocate for human rights and humanitarianism. In order to maintain this position, the United States must acknowledge the trend within the international community toward human security and protection and remain at, or at least near, the forefront of human rights law and IHL. Furthermore, **continued U.S. refusal undermines the Ottawa Convention,** which like other international law instruments, garners validity through consensus and mutual agreement. Without the support of the world’s dominant power, the Ottawa Convention cannot become customary international law; thus U.S. refusal provides leeway for rogue states to continue the use and production of persistent landmines. Ottawa Convention The Ottawa Convention is considered unique in that the global humanitarian community mobilized states in the effort to ban a weapon that was actively in use throughout the world. Eleven years after opening for ratification, the Convention has 156 States Parties, and international trade in landmines has virtually ceased.11 Civilian casualties are almost seventy percent below levels reported in the early 1990s.12 While several key states such as China, Russia, India, and the United States have not signed the Convention, very few states have used landmines in the last several years as a result of increasing stigmatization. Non-signatories to the Convention are very reluctant to use mines because of the high political costs involved. In the past five years, the only governments to deploy landmines were Russia, Myanmar, and Nepal; all of whom used the mines within their own borders to fight insurgencies.13 In terms of international law, the Ottawa Convention has been noted for its role in successfully incorporating the concepts of human security into the international legal framework. By using humanitarian advocacy and involving NGOs in the process, the Convention is the first treaty to eliminate a tool used for the protection of national security in favor of enhancing human security. The preamble to the Convention highlights this humanitarian focus in stating its purpose: T]o put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenseless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement, believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines. . . . 14 While the Convention establishes specific timetables and guidelines for disarmament, the most important provisions are those that require states to clear all mines from their territories and ensure an ongoing commitment to assist victims and threatened populations.15 Furthermore, reservations16 are not permitted under any circumstances, preventing states from maintaining any existing minefields or stockpiles. U.S. Landmine Policy and Its Implications The U.S. government has defended its decision not to sign the Ottawa Convention based on a number of factors. First, the United States is, by a considerable margin, the world’s largest financial donor to humanitarian mine action, contributing over $1.2 billion to activities in fifty countries since 1993. This funding supports mine clearance training and work, local mine risk education, victim assistance, mine-affected area surveys, and destruction of stockpiles. In many ways, these U.S. efforts surpass the requirements of the Ottawa Convention. Second, the United States has committed to using only detectable, non-persistent landmines that will self-detonate or lose power after a short period of time.17 Although landmines have not been used in any U.S. conflict since the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. government still views landmines as an indispensable military tool.18 Third, the U.S. government argues that the Ottawa Convention focuses too specifically on anti-personnel landmines while ignoring other unexploded ordnance (UXO).19 The United States maintains that the most effective method of controlling the UXO threat to civilians is the creation and implementation of responsible guidelines for their production, use, and subsequent removal. The Convention has been criticized for ignoring the dangers related to anti-tank mines, cluster munitions, and other UXOs.20 Fourth, the United States perceives the “mine-free” target of the Ottawa Convention to be an inefficient and misguided goal. The intention of the comprehensive clearance goal is to increase the international focus on mine clearance, while ensuring that areas and villages are not overlooked. The United States supports a “mine-impact free” goal which will eliminate the threat of landmines in populated areas and transportation routes,21 the method which it argues allows for the most cost-effective clearance of mine threats. Finally, the U.S. government has refused to sign the Ottawa Convention because it does not allow for reservations. According to the United States, the unique situation in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) of the Korean peninsula requires the use of antipersonnel landmines in order to deter North Korean forces from entering South Korea. Without landmines, a substantially higher number of troops and weaponry would be required in Korea and more lives would be at risk. As a result, the United States has determined that the military necessity of landmines outweighs the humanitarian benefits of a total ban on anti-personnel landmines. Because the United States has been a strong advocate for universal human rights in the past and initiated the call for a landmine ban, it has been widely criticized for its refusal to accede to the Ottawa Convention. The government clearly needs to balance its competing expectations and requirements, but the landmine issue has become politically volatile. The ICRC argues that landmines are not an indispensable military weapon and that their value is dramatically outweighed by their post-conflict effects. The stigmatization of mine use has made their political costs prohibitive. As international law moves into the arena of human security, the United States cannot afford to sacrifice its position in international affairs and international law to defend a marginally useful military tool. In order to examine the reasons behind U.S. landmine policy, it is important to contrast the prominent military and humanitarian viewpoints on the issue. The military viewpoint stresses the value of anti-personnel landmines in conflict situations. They are considered “force multipliers” because they allow for the protection of larger areas with fewer troops. During military operations, active battlefields are viewed in terms of tactics and strategic objectives. Traditionally, marginal efforts aim to minimize “collateral damage” to civilians during wartime, while most concentrate on the main strategic objectives. The United States maintains that the responsible use of landmines in conflict situations is proportionately acceptable, in terms of military value, weighed against the potential danger to civilians. The humanitarian viewpoint, on the other hand, focuses on the short- and long-term effects that landmines and other UXOs have on civilian populations. The ICRC conducted a study of the military effectiveness of landmine use and found that the weapons were generally used in violation of international law and that their use had **minimal effects on the outcome of the conflicts.**23 Because the responsible use of landmines requires substantial effort and organization, the ICRC concluded that armed forces are generally unable to follow IHL when marking and mapping landmines. Furthermore, because military operations focus on battlefield tactics, they often neglect to consider the post-conflict consequences when planting mines. In other words, battlefields often return to their use as crop fields, soccer fields, or playgrounds when conflicts end. The humanitarian viewpoint acknowledges the numerous and considerable effects that landmine presence can have on post-conflict recovery and development.24 The presence of both viewpoints is evident in the complex and contradictory arguments found in U.S. landmine policy. The United States claims that, by remaining outside of the restrictions and requirements of the Ottawa Convention, it has more freedom to dedicate efforts toward the greatest humanitarian threats from all types of UXOs.25 However, this rationalization fails to recognize the value of international solidarity and collective commitment. The primary purpose of the Ottawa Convention is to highlight the importance of human security under IHL by banning the use of anti-personnel landmines. The United States acknowledges the existence of humanitarian threats from UXOs, but has failed to recognize the importance of the Ottawa Convention in the legal process toward eliminating those threats. As illustrated by the recent Convention on Cluster Munitions,26 the international community intends to eliminate the humanitarian threat of persistent and indiscriminate weapons through the introduction of human security into international law. While both the United States and the international community claim to be concerned with reaching the same goal, the U.S. has chosen to take a slow, incremental approach in opposition to the international majority. As a result of 12 years of competing priorities and lack of determination, the United States is **preventing the full eradication of the** humanitarian **landmine threat.**27 Though it seems that the trend toward human security in international law will continue to move forward without the support of the United States, the refusal of such a dominant world power stands in the way of the Ottawa Convention becoming customary international law and **significantly hampers** the international protection of all victims from the threat of indiscriminate remnants of war. U.S. Policy Options The policy that the United States chooses to follow regarding the Ottawa Convention has important implications, both for human security and post-conflict development in future conflict areas and for the **framework of international law.** Over the last 15 years, U.S. landmine policy has reverted from a progressive to an increasingly ostracized stance. From its current position, the United States could follow one of three possible courses of action regarding landmine policy: (1) continued adherence to the current policy; (2) movement toward the standards set out on the Ottawa Convention with an exception for the Korean peninsula; or (3) accession to the Ottawa Convention. If it adheres to the current policy, the United States will continue to support humanitarian mine action on its own terms by identifying high-risk areas and considering the costs and benefits of removing landmines in remote areas. Continued support for mine clearance training, mine risk education, and victim assistance will continue to exceed the guidelines set out by the Ottawa Convention. The military will produce and stockpile non-persistent, detectable landmines and **retain the right** to deploy them in conflict. While it is highly unlikely that the United States would use landmines in future conflict due to the political consequences, the option will remain. Following this policy will keep the United States at odds with the global humanitarian movement and the international community, and will **prevent greater acceptance** of human security and protection into international law. The Ottawa Convention will remain partially effective and, although landmines will become increasingly stigmatized, their **use by rogue states and non-state actors will continue** to inflict suffering and obstruct development.28 As the human security concept moves toward the elimination of additional indiscriminate weapons and tactics to prevent the suffering of innocent civilians, the United States will be seen as supporting inhumane warfare as the government continues to focus strictly on national security. The second option would move U.S. policy in the direction of the Ottawa Convention mine ban, while maintaining an exception for the situation in the Korean DMZ. The goals of the Ottawa Convention would be strengthened to a small degree, as U.S. disapproval of landmine use will further stigmatize the weapon. Aside from Korea, it is unlikely that the United States would use landmines in future conflicts due to the growing stigmatization. Therefore, producing and stockpiling these weapons serves only to comfort military officials. However, it is unlikely that additional countries would accede to the Convention, preferring instead to declare their own exceptions for continued use. Such a trend of exceptions would mean that the landmine ban would not be considered customary international law. The third and most favorable option is a U.S. commitment to accede to the Ottawa Convention before the end of the current presidential term in 2012. The military would be allowed the next three years to develop alternative technology, while maintaining access to current stockpiles in the meantime. The Convention requires States Parties to remove all landmines in the territories they control within ten years, allowing the United States until 2022 to replace landmines in the Korean DMZ with alternative weapons. By rejoining the rest of the progressive international community, the United States could **renew its commitment to human rights** and IHL and cooperate in **constructing future treaties** focused on human security. With the United States as a State Party to the Ottawa Convention, the ban on landmine use would approach customary international law. With the full commitment of donor countries, the humanitarian threat of landmines would be significantly mitigated. Countries remaining outside of the Convention would **come under increased pressure to accede,** reducing the threat of landmine use to mostly nonstate actors. Because of the grave humanitarian threat posed by landmine use and UXOs, the United States must acknowledge that the civilian costs far outweigh their military value, and that international solidarity is the best path to their eradication. Conclusion While the purpose of the Ottawa Convention is clearly in line with the U.S. mission to support human rights and humanitarian action around the world, perhaps the most important reason for accession to the Convention are the treaty’s implications for the future of international law. While the United States has supported the elimination of civilian landmine threats over the last twenty years, it has also continued to insist on the tactical military importance of indiscriminate anti-personnel landmines and has developed its policy based heavily on the military viewpoint. This insistence flies in the face of the international community’s acknowledgement of the disproportionate humanitarian effect of such weapons and the successful introduction of the human security concept into international law. Accession to the Convention is in the best long-term interest of the United States, allowing it to stay near the forefront of international law. Possessing the technology and capability to develop new weaponry, the United States must find an alternative to landmine use in Korea. The cost of ignoring the international consensus in order to maintain a fifty-year-old war zone is short-sighted and in opposition to U.S. goals to spread freedom and improve international security.

#### Political civil society engagement with landmines is key to success

BERNSTEIN 08 Director of the Nobel Women’s Initiative, former coordinator of the ICBL from 1998-2004 [Elizabeth Bernstein, “Still Alive and Kicking,” from, Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security, edited by Jody Williams, Stephen D. Goose, and Mary Wareham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers] Page 46

Conclusion

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines is seen as a quintessential ex- pression of the ability of Committed civil society to play a meaningful role in resolving key issues of our times. ICBL activists have never rested on their lau- rels but constantly reaffirm their commitment to a mine-free World and are continuously forward looking, strategizing on next steps to bring the “utopian vision” of a mine-free World to complete reality through the framework of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Even in its most difficult moments at the end of 1997 and into 1998, the core of the campaign held firm and adjusted itself to its own new realities as well as to the reality ofthe newly negotiated Mine Ban Treaty and all the Work it would take to ensure the treaty made a difference to those living with the daily scourge of landmines.

Staying focused on the goal in the face of fatigue and other demanding is- sues remains a critical objective a decade on. In 2007, as the Mine Ban Treaty entered into its tenth year of existence, the ICBL’s Executive Director Sylvie Brigot described the treaty as “\_ . . a work in progress” and urged commitment By States Parties to “ . . . continue providing the political leadership and financial resources to ensure we can declare final victory in the battle against land- mines.”15 The ICBL began as a coalition of NGOs determined to reach the goal of banning antipersonnel landmines and then disband and move on to other work. Disbanding remains an objective. Not abandoning the Work until the job is done remains the focus. The ICBL has demonstrated that coalitions of independent NGOs can campaign together and achieve their goals. It has demonstrated an amazing ability to change with both the global context and as needed by its own membership.

At the same time, the campaign is really a transnational group of citizens who recognized a problem and took action to change it. Together we have proved that there is a place for “global citizen diplomacy.” Together We have shown that individual action can and does make a difference-especially when those individuals number in the thousands and tens of thousands. ICBL activists exemplify those who work for human rights writ large by accepting their responsibility to act as global citizens working for a better World.

#### The Ottawa Treaty isn’t flawless – but it is a good place to start challenging the security apparatus. Linking calls for government action to human security needs reshapes institutions according to common interests of individuals and states.

David **ROBERTS** Int’l Pol @ Ulster **‘8** *Human Insecurity* p. 180-183

But this critique is not undertaken with the intention of excluding realism from this debate. It would be profoundly uuwise to seek to marginalize the potential in realist positivist methodologies and **institutional experience**. It would also be reckless to forget their **global influence**. Other methodologies are as yet insufficiently established in realist global security architectures and thinking. Rather, it would seem intellectually healthy to **expand cooperation** **across disciplines and methodological boundaries** and to consider the roles of representation and rights more broadly in **human security** determinism. In identifying human insecurity creation within the dominant paradigm's assumptions and beliefs itself, we can no longer claim ignorance, or allow our ego defences to bypass our intellectual potential and human responsibilities. To the contrary, this work proposes the possibility of interdisciplinary alliances to **reprioritize human security** on the mainstream IR security agenda in order that we may accept and confront the institutional and structural roots of such enormous, **avoidable human catastrophes** as this work outlines. It has not been impossible to draw together different methodologies and epistemologies in a common security cause. Indeed, the basis of the quantitative data involved here reflects the positivist tradition. Already, at least one attempt has been made to broaden intellectual comprehension of wider security and its relevance to realism and IR in general. The notion of the 'security-development nexus' was expected by some to connect development issues to security debates. This relationship between economic impoverishment and international instability and insecurity has, however, proved difficult to establish and harder to sustain. The limited evidence presented in this book has affirmed relationships between economic impoverishment from international institutional edict, on the one hand, and low-intensity political instabilities at the domestic state level, on the other. But it has not demonstrated long-term damage to states' legitimacy or, on its own, led states to fail. Furthermore, no evidence assessed here indicates terrorist opportunism or interstate 'contagion', whereby one state's problems are transmitted to a neighbouring state, as in a latter-day 'domino theory'. Research is still in its early days, but there is little to sustain the role of the securitydevelopment nexus in state destabilization on its own; other factors are normally at work, such as resource finds, corruption, pre-existing ethnic tensions, greed and grievance, and so on (see also Cooper 2006; Duffield 2001). Legitimizing human security through sometimes spurious connections has not yet demonstrably helped undermine human insecurity. Retaining the development angle, however, and coupling it to legal institutions, might be a route worth considering. Although there is, as realists would rightly confirm, no overarching legal institution capable of reliably and regularly maintaining the rule of law in a state system that has no supra-governmental body, the range and capacity of cooperative international law have enjoyed some welcotne successes in areas considered out of range until very recently. Nor would a new architecture of law need to be established; emerging current practice has produced some heartening results for justice. For example, there have been trials at The Hague of dictators and despots; General Pinochet was questioned by police in London and legally harassed by Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon. Dr Henry Kissinger must consider with caution his international movements, a scenario unimaginable only recently. It is not beyond consideration that a similar, robust approach to **enforcing the basic right to life** enshrined in the UN and other constitutions could be refined, with executive decision-makers in IFIs and state legislatures becoming subject to **legal scrutiny** for failing to prevent avoidable deaths in the domains this book identifies. Hayden, for one, maintains that 'feasible alternative decisions and actions can be taken; alternative institutional schemes can be implemented which do not produce pervasive, persistent and radical inequality' (2007: 289). Given that the right to life is a basic right, should it not be protected as other essential laws are? And, given that life is being taken in the millions (since so many of these deaths are clearly avoidable), would it not be reasonable to link development to human rights and have that relationship fonnalized, enshrined and protected? Making moral arguments about human security has so far not made a sufficient difference to the daily casualties; and conceptualizing a potential realist nexus has been problematic. But if human rights were linked to development levels at which lethal human insecurity ceased, and these were taken seriously and enforced, levels of development would presumably have to rise, or those charged with achieving economic development and failing would presumably be held responsible. There is also evidence that human security itself has emerged as successful governmental policy, on the one hand, and that it has also mobilized global civil society. There is further potential, where governments can be convinced of the 'unassailable integrity' of a human security issue and mindful of the **positive benefits to such governments** **as well**, to extend aspects of this approach to the issues outlined in this work. It is said that 'the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house' (Audre Lord). But there are various approaches to challenging the 'deeply sedimented' structures involved; there are **processes of institutionalization** that may be replicated with different outcomes; and human agency is not solely negative for human insecurity. The current system is composed of ideational structure (andrarchy and neoliberalism) transmitting human agency (resulting in human insecurity) through international institutions. Already in existence are two counterparts for the reduction of human insecurity which also are recognized in the IR and social constructivism literature. Positive human agency exists in the form of the millions of people who are acting already to challenge the poverty that kills millions; in the form of the millions who confront global neoliberalism; in the form of the hundreds of millions of socially aware and responsible human beings who donate to human security and environmental causes (the two are obviously interwoven in some areas); or in the form of activists who lobby individually or in groups about what they perceive as human and social injustice. Simultaneously, this human agency forms and acts both independently of and in partnership with already extant international institutions. These may be state international bodies such as the UN or private charities like Oxfam, Medicins Sans Frontieres, and thousands of other bodies, large and small. In other words, two countervailing elements of global organization for human security are running functionally and with great effect. Where they are lacking is in **ideational hegemony**: the ability to uproot Waever's 'solidly sedimented' structures (2002: 32). It is regrettable, but this will not happen overnight. We should not, however, rule out the capacity of regimes to form additional international norms and arrangements. We are apprised already of their social construction rather than their magical appearance; it is not unreasonable to expect Conclusion 183 that the Ottawa Convention outcome that resulted in the banning of landmine use and export by a vast majority of states can be replicated. This outcome relied on a combination of global civil society campaigning; survivor activism, where, for example, Cambodian amputees travelled the Western world and described the physical conditions they experienced and the personal, social and economic ramifications of their experiences; celebrity support; media interventions; and it has also benefited from the high-profile intervention of British royalty (this list is not exhaustive). Many states involved in supporting the campaign were in part influenced by their own publics' increasing consciousness of this single issue of unchallengeable importance and moral value (other than a politician who described land mine clearance as 'politically correct'). According to Keohane, where states' governing politicians share a common interest of serving their citizens and maintaining office over non-zero-sum issues, they have shown a propensity to embark on cooperative action through institutions (1984; Murphy 2000: 798). An issue with such gravitas that might be identified as a single issue, but with a multidimensional background, such as the under-five mortality rate, is one of a number that would engage global public concern through institutional mobilization and heightened public consciousness from the ground up, without having to eliminate or otherwise transform the ideational superstructure that directly and indirectly causes such huge human insecurity in this area. While this approach does little to undo the structural determinism of the USMR, it does much to instigate international state and civil society mobilization, coordination and human security impact. If the ideational structure's hegemony of status and discourse cannot immediately be deconstructed (in the mechanistic sense), challenging its consequences from the ground upwards can not only have an impact like the Ottawa Convention (which is not without flaws), but can also expose gradually the institutional derivation from neoliberal domination of the human insecurity problem in the first instance. This is not a model for the elimination of global human insecurity, but it is a challenge to those who deny relationships between gender and security; between human agency (social construction) and lethal outcome; and between elite masculine determinism of security and the relative weakness of the boys, girls and women who experience the consequences of the hegemony of the masculine approach to securitization.

#### We should link the ethical frame of human security to our anti-landmine advocacy. Normative advocacy for human security is crucial for resolving global problems peacefully and avoiding the reduction of life to bare life.

Shahrbanou **TADJBAKHSH** Director Concentration on Human Security @ Master’s of Pulibc Affairs @ Sciences Po (Paris) **‘10** in *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding* Ed. Oliver Richmond p. 120-123

The curiosity of Chandler's second otherwise noble criticism, that human security approaches objectify other spaces by relegating threats to the post-colonial South, is that the critic seems to have accepted the so-called power of the North in shaping discourses and action. The critique buys into the presumed validity of the Grand Bargain: that the North provides development assistance to an underdeveloped South, while the South assures traditional security in exchange, by refraining from developing weapons, by curbing conflicts, etc. In this constellation, human security seems to read as a good that Western countries seem to provide and countries of the South seem to lack. But human security threats are 'located' in the developing world only by those who believe in a liberal and non-liberal division of the world based on countries that can 'act' (hence project their power) in other spheres, and those that are mere recipients of such benevolence/malevolence. This too is a narrow conception of the liberal human security approaches which believe that problems of the developing world of the South can and should be solved through interventions, financial assistance, human rights sanctions, democratisation, marketisation etc., all precepts for making liberal. The broad approach would instead argue for the universal applicability of the subject, conceived with regard to people's daily concerns - no matter where they live geographically. Relational, objective, and subjective perceptions of insecurity persist as much, if differently, among inhabitants of Parisian suburbs as they do in Darfur.23 The urban violence, job insecurities, health epidemics, privatisation of social delivery, militarisation of societies, etc. that plague industrialised societies of the North are as much human insecurities as the famine, wars, poverty, and genocides that characterise extreme situations of some countries, notably in the developing or post-colonial world. That is why the broader approaches may not agree with some academic attempts to propose a threshold of degree of severity of threats to human life,24 which would then fail to recognise the insecurity felt by people in Western welfare societies. contextual analysis, instead of quantitative absolute measurements, better reflects the full meaning attributed to a life worth living. What people consider vital varies across individuals, societies and cultures. 25 The narrow approach to human security discourses, when insisting on a threshold approach that distinguishes urgent threats, such as those to survival, that require immediate action, may forego strategy for short term action depending on the currency and will available for politicians to act, perpetuating conditions that allow Chandler's third criticism. Yet, for advocates of broad human security approaches, the mere recognition of structural violence26 and threats to dignity require, de facto, **strategic planning, root cause analysis**, **preventive action**, etc. Dignity-related threats are certainly not to be dealt with through short-term problemsolving approaches. They invite **critical assessment of structural causes**. In this regard, Chandler is **categorically mistaken** in his read of the two chapters of our book that look at interventions: instead of basing ourselves on the benefits of R2P, as he claims,27 we instead opted out for a practice of prior engagement by the international community, long before interventions are supposed to take place in front of fait accompli in the name of responsibility to protect, and in full recognition of the contributions of negative global politics and power asymmetries for the development of crisis in post-colonial and developing countries. The misdiagnosis of the ability of the 'dog to bark' is perhaps because Chandler, like many Western critics, engages with a **partial reading of human security** that **neglects dignity** and **emancipation**, **as opposed to bare life**, as a principle to protect. Chandler's invitation for proponents, critiques and counter-critiques to answer why and how human security approaches become co-opted by power and why there is supposedly little contestation of it as the most important (or only) field of research worthy of query, and to base the realm of possibility within empirical research only, betrays a partial understanding of the **narrow** liberal **interpretation** of the idea of human security, the one that happens to be projected onto the international system as the model to follow. Such partiality stems from **bias** towards the comfortable **materialist/ empiricist** trend in Anglo-Saxon academia to **relegate** non-material, **ideational** **factors** to intermediary roles. The critique, therefore, instead of recognising the full range of possibilities that the question of dignity and emancipation raise around values of the good life, and alternative spaces for their fulfilment, satisfies itself with what becomes a postmodern engagement with the power and politics of current academic and political practices. In a sense, it limits itself geographically to the **vertical** **dialogue** in the **institutional** **North**, by the North and for the North, relegating other spheres to **oblivion at best and objectification at worst**. The problem is not that critical discourses serve the policy needs of the so-called powerful, but the **underlying assumption** of **complicity** that exists between the supposed power of Western political circles, engulfed in their perceptions of responsibility vis-a-vis others, and that of critical academics, **assuming only the responsibility to debunk the power of the powerful**. The problem is not only the misuse of such concepts by political elites, but the **limited exercise of debunking proposed by Western critiques** that only follow the scent of power. In this complicity, human security shifted from its original descriptive and universal concept, concerned with global justice and equity in the mid-1990s writings of Mahbub Ul Haq, who at the time was very much concerned about the North-South divide, to a prescriptive tool in international relations, 'for others' and 'by others' in foreign policy and aid policy. And critiques accept this shift uncritically. towards genuine emancipation from dogs and suchlike Ultimately, though, **it does not matter** whether the limited kinds of human security frameworks that have been understood and accepted through Western bias in political and academic circles have reinforced rather than challenged power relations. What matters is that engaging and **using the broad lens of human security** allows an identification of the range of referent objects of threats, the nature of a broad scope of menaces (whether to existence, welfare, or emancipation), and the variety of subjects for possible responses. When pluralism is accepted, there is no need to wait for empirical measurements to demonstrate whether human security has served the needs of emancipation or the interests of power. 28 In this framework, idealism rules, **normative speech acts rule**, and so does prescription, because anything less would succumb to Western or particularly AngloAmerican preference for empiricism (knowledge being inferred only from observable characteristics of reality) and for materialism (causation being sought only in material factors). Once in the realm of normative theorising that surrenders to the spirit of ideas and ideals, the confusion between description and prescription, empirical analysis and **normative advocacy is not a detriment, but an imperative**. Otherwise, succumbing to the limiting but standard practice of empirical analysis, from which theorising can take place (ascending from earth to heaven, the opposite of what Chandler accuses human security advocates of doing), not only limits the realm of the ethical and desirable, but also fails to take heed of the opening that Robert Cox provided when he unveiled the basic truism that 'all theory is for someone and for some purpose'.29 Ultimately, the (mis/ab)use of the human security approach by institutions and Western powerful states does not detract from the viability of the framework for recognising alternative perspectives. That is why the **broad** **emancipatory**, as opposed to narrow liberal, approaches to human security **present more spaces for contention** and pluralist voices. 3o In liberalism, critics contend, when 'rational consensus' and agreement are the only way in which peaceful relations can be created, disagreement and conflict are ultimately divisive and can lead to violence.31 Emancipation, by contrast, requires accepting difference and deviation, alternative values, and negotiating new relationships. **Regardless** of whether or not it is **successful** in displacing existing power-based interests, the human security approach, in its broad emancipatory notion, is also an **ethical** **framework** because of its focus on the broad needs and aspirations of individuals qua **persons**. It extends the notion of 'safety' to a condition beyond mere existence (survival and bare life) to a life worth living: hence, welfare, well-being and dignity of human beings.32 As such, it can be a useful framework to engage with the ethical concerns around the legitimisation of contemporary peacebuilding.

#### Human security key for confronting structural violence. We provide the best framework for addressing government repression, genocide, discrimination, environmental degradation and poverty.

Patrick **HAYDEN** IR @ St. Andrews **‘4** “Constraining War: Human Security and the Human Right to Peace” *Human Rights Review* October-December p.38-40

The more expansive formulation of human security represents a radically different approach to security from that offered the by the traditional realist security paradigm. The fundamental difference in orientation between the two approaches is that for the traditional paradigm security means the protection and welfare of the state *per se*, whereas for new formulation security means the protection and welfare of the individual human being. While the classical paradigm is clearly realist in that it is narrowly preoccupied with the state and national security interests, the human security paradigm is consistent with cosmopolitanism in that it adopts a more comprehensive approach concerned in the first instance with persons and threats to their existence and dignity.10 It should be noted that the human security paradigm does not suggest that national security becomes irrelevant; rather it becomes embedded within a wider framework of interests that takes the quality of life of the individual human being and the justice of fundamental social institutions as primary components of security viewed holistically. Along with the end of the cold war and its “great powers” rivalry, the past decade has seen increased recognition of a number of phenomena associated with globalization that challenge many of the norms enshrined in the Westphalian system. The entrenchment of global capitalism, the internationalization of telecommunications and media, the explosive growth of supranational organizations and transnational corporations, the intensified flows of people, fashions, drugs, weapons and culture across borders, and the rise of global terrorism, all have undermined the traditional claims that the state alone is able to guarantee the physical security, order, and integrity of a given territory, and of the people who reside within it. It seems that not only is the state not as “self-reliant” as it is portrayed to be by realists, but recent changes in the international system and how world politics is conducted—which include processes and agents of integration as well as fragmentation—demonstrate a plethora of challenges to the very existence of individuals and communities that are **incapable** of being addressed on the basis of the state-centric assumptions of the national security paradigm. Given the institutional and processual transformations occurring in conjunction with globalization, appealing to realist orthodoxy as a basis upon which to construct genuinely secure modes of human existence has become increasingly implausible. Former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who became well known for his advancement of the human security concept during his diplomatic career, captured the cosmopolitan character of human security when he observed that threats to human security are those that “strike directly home to the individual” and “largely ignore state boundaries.” Such threats are often violent and systemic in nature, and require “action and cooperation at different levels— global, regional, and local—if they are to be tackled effectively.”11 Human security concerns transcend the traditional statist confines of national security, and tend to focus on elimination or prevention of the causes of threats to human security. The types of threats identified with the human security concept include armed conflict, ethnocultural violence, genocide, terrorism, violent crime, slavery, government repression, discrimination, environmental degradation, deprivation of basic needs, underdevelopment, and the spread of small arms, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction. In sum, for the human security concept, the core threats are those that present a clear and consistent (and, sadly, preventable) danger to “human life and dignity.”12 Another way of putting these last points is that human security “recognises that an individual’s personal protection and preservation comes not just from the safeguarding of the state as a political unit, but also from access to individual welfare and the **quality of life**.”13 Consequently, the human security approach is concerned with both direct and indirect violence, or organized and “**structural” violence**, none of the forms of which can be understood in exclusively national or territorial terms and many of which are exacerbated by the statist biases of conventional international politics. In addition to the commonly recognized forms of direct violence (such as international and domestic war, genocide, and ethnic cleansing) other forms of direct violence (including slavery, physical abuse, crime, and terrorism) along with forms of structural violence (such as political repression, discrimination, and the lack of food, water, and basic health care) are all identified as critical threats to personal safety, well-being, and dignity. Because the new security paradigm places the individual’s well-being and dignity within the context of humanity rather than the sovereign state, the normative focus of realism gives way to that of cosmopolitanism. The security referent is no longer the citizen of a particular sovereign state, but all persons understood as “members of a transcendent human community with common global concerns.”14 Security is not the domain of a privileged few, but the entitlement of all human beings. Neither is the goal of security simply the preservation of the state (or the society of states); rather it is the preservation of human well-being. The normative focus also shifts from that of power struggles and unilateral militarism as the means by which to obtain national security, towards recognition that genuine security can only be ensured through multilateral efforts aimed at evading or curtailing war and other forms of direct and indirect violence, protecting human rights, and providing the social and environmental resources needed for a safe and dignified human life. In short, human security is inseparable from conditions of peace.

#### Belief in the possibility of civil repair key to anti-colonialism, limiting arbitrary state violence, and empowerment. Our impact turns and outweighs the k.

Jeffrey **ALEXANDER** Sociology @ Yale & Co-Director Center for Cultural Sociology **‘6** *The Civil Sphere* p. 549-553

IN THIS BOOK, I have presented a new theory of society by defining a new sphere, its cultural structures, its institutions, and its boundary relations with discourses and institutions outside it. With this theory, I have tried to create a new social fact and to examine it empirically in a series of case studies. If this new theory is productive, and the case studies illuminating, we will better understand our society and ourselves, and we will see more clearly the possibilities of justice. Nothing is more practical than a good theory. For a good part of the last two centuries, many social theorists, activists, and ordinary persons interested in the project of social improvement have been preoccupied with a particular form of critical thinking called Marxism and, more recently, with critical theory. Their concerns have lain less with thinking through the possibilities of justice broadly construed and the institutions it might necessitate than with justice as it might be realized in the form of socialism and with the equal distribution of economic resources. The purpose of this book has been to examine a more fundamental question, one overlooked in this narrower focus, that has to do with the foundations of social criticism per se, and I have sought throughout to broaden our understanding of these foundations. The death of the socialist dream is not the end of critical thought, deep institutional reform, or cultural discourse in a utopian vein. It is not this or that institutional form that marks the critical strand of democratic life. Civil solidarity-that is the real utopia. It lies beneath every particular demand for institutional reform, every historically specific demand for cultural reformation. The utopia of a truly civil solidarity informs every manifestation of the restless and critically demanding spirit that marks democratic life. It is the general language of every specific, historically delineated form of reformist speech. Utopianism is not over. To the contrary, it is being continuously rede\_ fined. We do not know where this restless spirit will lead. We cannot guess what new evil the intrusive spirit of civil hermeneutics will interpret and construct next. The civil sphere's utopian discourse is not an entirely freefloating signifier, but neither is it rigidly defmed. In the centuries since it assumed a national form, there has never been certainty about where this spirit will alight. For now at least, the worker-centered dream of dramatically transforming civil society into socialism has faded. In its moJerate form, the dream transmogrified into social democracy and reformist liberalism. In its radical form, it was a totalizing vision, a kind of big-bang version of civil repair. It may return again someday in another, less totalizing form, one that is less inclined toward an abstract equality that trumps justice in its other, plural ways. That might be a good thing. For now, we are living in a world of smaller and more discrete utopian dreams, of family, of conjugal and erotic love, of the kingdom of god on earth, of the perfect market, of equilibrated nature, or a pure liberal state. These are sphere-specific demands, and their advocates often want to be civil-sphere free**.** Rather than resenting civil injustice, they celebrate and idealize the qualities of noncivil life. sometimes as indispensable facilitating inputs to the good society. often as superior forms of justice in themselves, and it is the civil sphere itself' that often seems to intrude. There does, in fact, need always to be adjustments in boundary relations between civil and uncivil spheres. Institutions change. Industrial becomes postindustrial, sex becomes more detached from love, women from husbands and men. The scope of private life becomes enlarged even as civil controls on arbitrary authority take hold. Boundary relations need to be adjusted for new historical times. The discourse of civil society is a pattern of signifiers. About its particular and specific signifieds, history will decide. But shifting involvements always shift again. We live in relatively conservative, chastened, and sometimes frightened times, but the spheres outside civil society still cannot be seen as merely benign, much less as purely facilitating inputs to democratic life. They will inevitably be seen as destructive intrusions as well. Civil society is a project. It is a restless aspiration that lies deep in the soul of democratic life. Great utopian projects of democracy rocked Western and Eastern societies in the last decades of the twentieth century. In the world of intellectual life, one major result was the revival of" civil society." We must take hold of this concept before it is too late. We must make civil society into a major focus of empirical and theoretical thought and thus to everyday social life**.** That has been my ambition here. In Part I, I retrieved "civil society" from the cobwebs of earlier social theory. Once it made good sense to think of civil society as all the realms outside the state. Later, during the earlier days of industrial capitalism, many were afraid that civil society had disappeared, or been narrowed to mimic the selfishness of economic life. It is this vision that, in modern social science. allowed the spirit ofThrasymachus free rein. Realism is the salve for disappointment. But civil society has not disappeared. It is not everywhere, but it is not nowhere, either. Rather than dancing on its grave. we need to transform the idea of civil society in a critical way. It needs to be recentered on the promise of a community of individuals, centered on solidarity of a distinctively civil kind. Civil society is not everywhere except the state. A differentiated sphere of justice. it contends with and often conflicts with the value demands of spheres. In Part II of Civil Sphere, we left the world of high theory to discover the imbedded discourse and institutions of everyday social lite. Rather than an abstract deduction of philosophers, the normative stipulations of civil society turn out to be the language of the street, the television, novels, polls, parties, politics, office, and scandal. This rich and textured language is not only about utopia but about the evils that impede it. It turns out, in tact. that ideal inclusion is always shadowed by pollution and exclusion. The e\"ils of modernity are not anomalies. Postmodernity will not overcome them. They are systemic products of the search for civil justice and the good life. But if we cannot overcome binarism, we can fundamentally change its referents. There will alw

ays be two goalposts, but we shift them, even in the middle of play. This is what concerned us in Parts III and IV. The civil sphere is a promise, and this promise can be redeemed. Outsiders demand the expansion of the discourse of liberty. Stigmatized individuals and groups, polluted by the discourse of repression, can be purified and redeemed. If leaders are skillful, followers are brave, and the stars are right, movements for civil repair can \ucceed. But often they do not. History can go backward. The cracks in civil society split open. The golden bowl can drop and split into parts. It can be thrown down and shattered. The discourse of repression can triumph, and barbarism can rise in its place. Though the empirical studies in Civil Sphere concern movements inside of nation-states or regions, its theoretical reflections have been developed without reference to scale. They refer to a way of imagining and organizing a society, not to a particular expanse. They do not necessarily refer to city, nation, or region. It is possible, indeed, for the imagining and the organizing of civil society to go beyond the territory of the nation-state. As the scale of other institutions, interactions, and discourses expands, so might the organization of the civil sphere. If it were possible to organize a global sphere, the systematic problem of earthly war would cease, for civil virtue could not be demonstrated by exterminating the other side. It would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve this new resting place for the spirit of civil utopia. There would have to be a world state or something like a state for civil communication to become regulation on a global scale and for civil repair to proceed. Still, a more global playing field has already emerged. Even if were able to establish a global civil sphere, and to extend the goalposts of civil society to the other side of the earth, the binary nature of civil discourse and the contradictions of time, place, and function would not go away. Certainly. they have not done so in the nation-state. The spirit of civil society will always he restless. Its boundary relations will continue to be dynamic, and it will be as liable to exclusionary integration as it is within the nation-state. The contradictions would still be alarming, and struggles over civil repair would still be contingent and dramatic. In a world of increasingly dangerous weapons and political tactics, such a globalized civil sphere may be the only way to proceed. Without a global range, the promises even of civil society in its national form may die. Only the civil sphere can regulate force and eliminate arbitrary violence. It does so through persuasion and civil power and, if necessary, by dispensing force to defend democratic solidarity and to keep the aspirations of civil society alive. As violence becomes global, so must the civil sphere. We cannot foresee how the life and times of the civil sphere will proceed. At the beginning of the last century we could not have predicted that the fledgling feminist struggle would eventually create massive movements of civil regulation to free women £rom male power; or that gays and lesbians would demand civil unions and eventually their full freedoms as equal and autonomous human beings; or that masses of nonwhite people would overthrow every great colonial power in the name of civil aspirations for independence, so that they could create civil power to regulate their own states. Nor could we have anticipated the horrifying scale of military technology and how difficult it would still be, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, to regulate violence in the name of civil life. What we can know for certain is that the discourse and structure of the civil sphere will remain. It will still be restless, and its dynamism will be dangerous and contradictory. But the discourse of liberty will continue, and the hopes for civil repair will remain. Civil society is a project. [t inspires hope for a democratic life.

# 2AC

## Antiblackness

### Perm

### A2 Congress is bad

#### Not circumvent – US not use land mines

AFP 5 – 19 – 10 US senators send letter to Obama urging landmine ban [<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gO2F54cnaviWfKUjbPtz1_fatQXw>]

Two out of three US Senators sent a letter to President Barack Obama urging him to work toward the ratification of the 1997 treaty banning anti-personnel landmines, the Senate said Wednesday.

Signed by 68 senators, including 10 Republicans, the letter supports the Obama administration's ongoing review of US policy on landmines and is the first indication the Senate is in favor of ratifying the treaty, which the US refuses to sign.

Significantly, it represents one more than the 67 votes needed for ratification, however, the senators in their letter make no firm commitment on a vote.

"We are confident that through a thorough, deliberative review the administration can identify any obstacles to joining the Convention and develop a plan to overcome them as soon as possible," the letter said.

Days before the second conference reviewing the Ottawa Convention began in November in Colombia, the Obama administration said its position on the landmines treaty remained unchanged, but that it was reviewing US policy on the issue.

The review is scheduled to end by late September, according to Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy, who criticized the White House's refusal last year to join the treaty and sponsored the letter to Obama.

"Anti-personnel landmines, which are triggered by the victim, have no place in the arsenal of a modern military," Leahy said Tuesday in the Senate.

### Wilderson – civil society

### A2 K of Human

#### Though the concept of humanity is a pre-requisite for a politics that can fight atrocity. Critique of humanity justifies race-war.

Hannah **ARENDT** **‘3** in *The Portable Hannah Arendt* p. 155

For many years now we have met Germans who declare that they are ashamed of being Germans. I have often felt tempted to answer that I am ashamed of being human. This elemental shame, which many people of the most various nationalities share with one another today, is what finally is left of our sense of international solidarity; and it has not yet found an adequate political expression. Our fathers’ enchantment with humanity was of a sort which not only light-mindedly ignored the national question; what is far worse, it did not even conceive of the terror of the idea of humanity and of the Judeo-Christian faith in the unitary origin of the human race. It was not very pleasant even when we had to bury our false illusions about “the noble savage,” having discovered that men were capable of being cannibals. Since then people have learned to know one another better and have learned more and more about the evil potentialities in men. The result is that they have recoiled more and more from the idea of humanity and they become more susceptible to the doctrine of race, which denies the very possibility of a common humanity. They instinctively felt that the idea of humanity, whether it appears in a religious or humanistic form, implies the obligation of a general responsibility which they do not wish to assume. For the idea of humanity, when purged of all sentimentality, has the very serious consequence that in one form or another mean must assume responsibility for all crimes committed by men and that all nations share the onus of evil by all others. Shame at being a human being is the purely individual and still non-political expression of this thought. In political terms, the idea of humanity, excluding no people and assigning a monopoly of guilt to no one, is the only guarantee that one “superior race” after another may not feel obligated to follow the “natural law of the right of the powerful, and exterminate “inferior races unworthy of survival”’ so that at the end of an “imperialistic age” we should find ourselves in a stage which would make the Nazis look like crude precursors of future political methods. To follow a non-imperialistic policy and maintain a non-racist faith becomes daily more difficult because it becomes daily clearer **how great a burden mankind is for man.** Perhaps those Jews, to whose forefathers we owe the first conception of the idea of humanity, knew something about the burden when each year they used to say “Our Father and King, we have sinned before you,” taking not only the sins of their own community but all human offenses upon themselves. Those who today are ready to follow this road in a modern version do not content themselves with the hypocritical confession “God be thanked, I am not like that,” in horror at the undreamed-of-potentialities of the German national character. Rather, **in fear and trembling**, have they finally realized of what man is capable—and this is indeed the precondition of any modern political thinking. Such persons will not serve very well as functionaries of vengeance. This, however, is certain: Upon them and only upon them, who are filled with a genuine fear of the inescapable guilt of the human race, can there be any reliance when it comes to fighting fearlessly, uncompromisingly, everywhere against the incalculable evil that men are capable of bringing about.

#### Political use of humanity turns their racism impacts. Historically, humanism was crucial for global abolitionism and anti-racism.

Paul **GILROY** Anthony Giddens Prf. of Social Theory @ London School of Economics **‘9** *Race and the Right to be Human* p. 13-15

The structure of sentimental feeling articulated by Harriet Beecher Stowe was instrumental in the formation of a trans-national moral collectivity and in winning recognition of the suffering humanity of the slave whom it was no longer possible to dismiss as a brute. Through her voice and chosen genre, distinctive patterns of “heteropathic” identification appear to have leaked not only into Europe but further afield as well. Uncle Tom’s Cabin helped to compose a cosmopolitan chapter in the moral history of our world. Is all of that potential for political action and pedagogy to be damned now because **campus anti-humanism** doe**sn’t approve of the dubious aesthetic and moral registers** in which an un**-exotic otherness was initially made intelligible**? The scale of the historical and interpretative problems posed by the case of Uncle Tom’s Cabin can only be glimpsed here. George Bullen, keeper of books at the British Museum compiled a bibliographic note included in the repackaged 1879 edition. He revealed that almost three decades after publication, Stowe’s novel had been translated into numerous languages including Dutch, Bengali, Farsi, Japanese, Magyar and Mandarin. Fourteen editions had been sold in the German language during the first year of publication and a year later, seventeen editions in French and a further six in Portuguese had also appeared. In Russia, the book had been recommended as a primer in the struggle against serfdom and was duly banned. The first book to sell more than a million copies in the US, the publication of Stowe’s novel was a world historic event. Though it cemented deeply problematic conceptions of slave passivity, redemptive suffering and indeed of racial type, **it was also instrumental in spreading notions of black dignity and ontological depth** as well as the anti-racist variety of universal humanism that interests me. This combination merits recognition as a potent factor in the circulation of a version of human rights that racial hierarchy could not qualify or interrupt. The example of Stowe draws attention to issues which would reappear through the nineteenth century as part of struggles to defend indigenous peoples, to improve the moral and juridical standards of colonial government and to reform the immorality and brutality of Europe’s imperial order. This activity was not always altruistically motivated. How those themes developed in the period after slavery is evident from the para-academic work of campaigners like Harriet Colenso, Ida B. Wells, Roger Casement and E.D. Morel. The constellation of writings produced by these critical commentators on racism, justice and humanity needs to be reconstructed in far greater detail than is possible here. They can nonetheless be seen to comprise a tradition of reflection on and opposition to racial hierarchy that, even now, has the power, not only to disturb and amend the official genealogy provided for Human Rights but also to re-work it entirely around the tropes of racial difference. Allied with parallel insights drawn from struggles against colonial power, these interventions contribute to a counterhistory of the contemporary conundrum of rights and their tactical deployment. This neglected work remains significant because debate in this field is increasingly reduced to an unproductive quarrel between jurists who are confident that the world can be transformed by a better set of rules and sceptics who can identify the limits of rights talk, but are almost always disinterested in racism and its metaphysical capacities. Thinkers like Wells and Morel were alive to what we now call a **deconstructive** **approach**. They identified problems with rights-talk and saw the way that racial difference mediated the relationship of that lofty rhetoric to brutal reality. They grasped the limits of rights-oriented institutional life empirically and saw how rights-claims entered into the battle to extend citizenship. But, their **vivid sense of the power of racism** meant that the **luxury of any casual anti-humanism could not be entertained**. They wished to sustain the human in human rights and to differentiate their own universalistic aspirations from the race-coded and exclusionary humanisms which spoke grandly about all humanity but made whiteness into the prerequisite for recognition. Their alternative required keeping the critique of race and racism dynamic and demanding nothing less than the opening of both national- and world-citizenship to **formerly infrahuman beings like the negro**. Grimké, Wells and the rest appealed against racism and injustice in humanity’s name. Their commentaries might even represent the quickening of the new humanism of which Frantz Fanon would speak years later. The movement these commentators created and mobilized persisted further into the twentieth century when new causes and opportunities were found that could repeat and amplify its critique of racialized political cultures and terroristic governmental administration.

#### Reject the absolutist critique of humanitarianism. Building on critical cosmopolitanism helps build global participatory democracy.

Fuyuki **KURASAWA** Faculty Fellow Center for Cultural Sociology @ Yale **‘7** *The Work of Global Justice: Human Rights as Practices* p. 202-205

If a starry-eyed perception of human rights is highly dubious, so too is its opposite in the politically ontologizing game of human rights blackmail\_ namely, the assertion that, far from being simply a possibility among others, the instrumental appropriation described above reveals the very essence of and underlying truth about humanitarianism. Following this line of thinking, human rights function as ideological devices through which capitalist globalization and Western military interventionism can be made to appear valid (or at least palatable to liberals), veils that distort or conceal the actual imperatives of a world system structured by the realpolitik of national self-interest and economic exploitation. Accordingly, to believe that human rights stand for anything beyond maintaining the West's domination (by intervening or threatening to intervene in countries of the global South whenever it may prove strategically useful) and spreading the neoliberal mantra of free trade (that is, facilitating the unregulated circulation of capital across borders and the unlimited access to an international pool of cheap labour-power) is to fall prey to the worst excesses of idealism. Often following in the footsteps of Marx's On the Jewish Question, critics assert that human rights under a capitalist mode of production are but abstract entitlements whose proper function is to protect and entrench private property and guarantee formal political freedom and equality, while leaving the material bases of subordination and exploitation untouched. Further, the implication is that liberal individualism represents the inalienable core of human rights, which cannot but support a thin conception of negative freedom whereby self-maximizing and monadic subjects are 'empowered' to make unimpeded choices (about who to vote for on occasion, but mostly what to purchase often) in the marketplace of civil and political life (Brown 2004: 455; Teeple 2004). This absolutist line of thinking raises several incontrovertible problems about human rights today. Foremost among these is the ever-widening disjuncture between the consolidation of a human rights industry (consisting of mainstream NGOs and multilateral international organizations), on the one hand, and the unjust civil-political and eroding socioeconomic conditions under which most persons in the global South dwell, on the other. We need not enumerate the numerous contemporary instances of structural and political violence around the world to conclude that the record of concrete human rights achievements in the last half-century is at best a mixed one; modest improvements have been realized in some spheres for certain persons, yet a vast segment of humankind has experienced either stagnating or deteriorating circumstances (due to poverty, disease, civil war, gender subordination, etc.) . Some of the other major flaws, mentioned above, concern the instrumentalization of human rights for the purposes of legitimating neoliberal or neoconservative ends, and their immiseration to the point that citizens are envisaged as individualistic human rights consumers responsible for achieving, or failing to achieve, whatever freedoms they are formally granted. A substantive critical theory of global justice must always be cognizant of the fact that these scenarios are very real possibilities on the terrain of political and discursive contestation upon which human rights are situated, without following absolutist thinking in its political essentialization of them as ontological necessities. Hence, we **need not throw out the baby** of the potentially emancipatory uses of human rights with the bathwater of their failed realization or dubious appropriations. For one, it is **unwarranted** to infer the existence of a causal relationship, instead of a simple correlation, between the ubiquity of human rights discourses and the lack of alleviation of suffering and material deprivation in the global South. Global injustices are not being reproduced because of human rights per se (an essentializing argument), but rather partly - although by no means exclusively - because of the excessively formalist conception and practice of emancipatory politics that many human rights advocates have hitherto pursued. Indeed, the crux of the problem lies with such advocates' excessive focus on normative and institutional matters, which has misled them into conflating the build-up of an official human rights infrastructure with structural transformations of the world order that would produce actual progress in the socio-economic and civil-political circumstances of populations on the ground. Yet as I claimed in this book, formalism is but one paradigm through which to interpret the field of human rights; the latter cannot be reduced to the former. Nevertheless, why should emancipatory projects be connected to the notion of human rights at all? Once we distance ourselves from the political essentialism of the human rights blackmail outlined above, the answer can be found in the prospects opened up by a shift of analytical focus from formalist arrangements to practices of global justice through which groups and persons may use human rights discourses and established human rights institutions strategically. In other words, while it should not solely orient itself toward or be framed by human rights, the work of global justice can draw on their normative and organizational resources to accomplish the tasks and confront the perils that compose each of its modes of practice. This amounts to deploying what Zizek, followingLefort, has identified as the **'symbolic efficacy of rights'**; the formal dimension of human rights does not remain merely as is, for it leaves traces, and thus has **important spillover effects**, upon the substantive content of socio-economic and civil-political conditions (Lefort 1986: 260-1; Zizek 2005: 130). Because of their **vast public recognition** 1 **high standing and institutional development**, human rights offer a **potent moral grammar** and set of **ethical horizons** through which to produce an immanent critique of the existing world order, whose functioning blatantly contradicts governments' and international organizations' official commitments to the realization of such rights. Correspondingly, civil society actors are reflexively positioning their struggles 'under the sign of the defence of human rights' (Lefort 1986: 242), so that situations of genocide, extreme poverty, gender subordination and health pandemics, among others, can be conceived of and denounced as violations of the fundamental rights to which all human beings are entitled (Lefort 1986: 261- 2). Rather than adopting a weakly moralizing strategy satisfied with lamenting how deplorable such situations are, progressive groups can gain a certain degree of ethical and institutional traction by presenting them as unjust conditions that deprive persons of their universally recognized rights to safety, food, shelter, gender equality, health, and so on. In addition, the idea of the work of global justice points beyond the symbolic efficacy of human rights, toward a substantive thickening and politically progressive resignification of them to sustain a transcendent \ mode of critique that puts into question the current parameters of the world order. Since the meaning of human rights as a discursively mediated social imaginary is open to contestation, progressive civil society groups can subversively appropriate them against their liberal individualist roots (present since their emergence in international declarations and treaties half-a-century ago). Indeed, once formally entrenched and validated, a bundle of rights can be thickened to the point of becoming a means through which to tackle the **systemic roots of situational and structural injustices**. When inserted into an emancipatory politics that views them as components of practices of global justice, then, human rights can create the **normative** and **institutional leverage** to organize and legitimate demands for structural changes that support an **alternative globalization.** The latter becomes a sine qua non condition to end mass abuses of civil-political and socio-economic rights, and more affirmatively, to enact the symbolic and material underpinnings of the oft declared principle of universal moral equality. This is precisely why certain global justice activists have pushed for the signing of enforceable international treaties on socio-economic rights and for the creation of the International Criminal Court - and conversely, why many states and fractions of capital have been opposed to both initiatives (lest a government be sued for violating the basic rights to food, shelter and health of its citizens, or that military personnel and political leaders be prosecuted for war crimes).

### Occidentalism

#### This Occidentalist view turns the case – flips the power binary and allows the destruction of humanity

**Buruma and Margalit 04**Ian Buruma is a Dutch writer and academic. Much of his work focuses on the culture of Asia, particularly that of China and 20th-century Japan and Avishai Margalit, is an Israeli George F. Kennan Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, and Professor Emeritus in Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem “Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies” P. 10-11

There are, of course, perfectly valid reasons to be critical of many elements that go into the venomous brew we call Occidentalism. Not all the critiques of the Enlightenment lead to intolerance or dangerous irrationalism. The belief in universal progress, driven by business and industry, is certainly open to criticism. Blind faith in the market is a self-serving and often damaging dogma. American society us far from ideal, and U.S. policies are often disastrous. Western colonialism has much to answer for. And the revolt of the logical against claims of the global can be legitimate, even necessary. But criticism of the West, harsh as it may be, is not the issue here. The view of the West in Occidentalism is like the worst aspects of its counterpart, Orientalism, **which strips its human targets of their humanity**. Some Orientalist prejudices made non-Western people seem less than fully adult human beings; they had the minds of children, and could thus be treated as lesser breads.**Occidentalism is at least as reductive**; its bigotry simply turns the Orientalist view upside down. To diminish an entire society or a civilization to a mass of soulless, decadent, money-grubbing, rootless, faithless, unfeeling parasites is a form of intellectual destruction. Once again, if this were merely a matter of distaste or prejudice, it would not be of great interest. Prejudices are part of the human condition. But when the idea of others as less than human gathers revolutionary force, **it leads to the destruction of human beings**.

#### Independently, the elimination of Western Knowledge should also be a concern – losing any type of knowledge decreases the chance of survival

**Agrawal 95** Arun Agrawal, “Dismantling the Divide Between Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge” Development and Change Vol. 26 (1995), 413439. Institute of Social Studies 1995. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Rd, Oxford OX4 lJF, UK.

A number of inconsistencies and problems mark the assertions from the neo- indigenistas. Their case seems superficially persuasive. Indigenous knowledge and peoples, the argument goes, are disappearing all over the world as a direct result of the pressures of modernization. Their disappearance, in turn, constitutes an enormous loss to humanity since they possess the potential to remedy many of the problems that have emasculated development strategies during the past five decades. **Greater efforts must, therefore, be made to save, document and apply indigenousstrategies of survival.**

**But neo-indigenistas remain committed to the same kind of dichotomous classification that dominated the world view of the modernization theorists**,\* in spite of their seeming opposition to the idea that indigenous institutions and knowledge are obstacles to the march by the Angel of Progress. Both groups of theorists seek to create two categories of knowledge - western and indigenous - relying on the possibility that a finite and small number of characteristics can define the elements contained within the categories. This attempt is bound to fail because different indigenous and western knowledges possess specific histories, particular burdens from the past, and distinctive patterns of change. Colin MacCabe (1988: xvii) puts it: ‘any one world is always, also, a radical heterogeneity which radiates out in a tissue of differences that undoes the initial identity’.

### Altnerative

**Afropessimism’s** [specifically Wilderson’s] **understanding of the black subject positions us in a place of hopelessness, making change impossible**

**Moten 13** Fred Moten, Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh), *The South Atlantic Quarterl*yFall 2013

Now I want us to try to think about the relation between Mackey’s and Wilderson’s dialectics of held fantasy. Wilderson’s register is more explicitly philosophical and, so, our registers might have to shift as well. Entrance into the philosophy of the subject is also perilous, but it seems as if our belatedness makes such peril necessary if the goal is to approach the ship and its hold. Wilderson says:

To put it bluntly, the imaginative labor of cinema, political action, and cultural studies are all afflicted with the same theoretical aphasia. They are speechless in the face of gratuitous violence.

This theoretical aphasia is symptomatic of a debilitated ensemble of questions regarding political ontology. At its heart are two registers of imaginative labor. The first register is that of description, the rhetorical labor aimed at explaining the way relations of power are named, categorized, and explored. The second register can be characterized as prescription, the rhetorical labor predicated on the notion that everyone can be emancipated through some form of discursive, or symbolic, intervention.

But emancipation through some form of discursive or symbolic intervention is wanting in the face of a subject position that is not a subject position—what Marx calls “a speaking implement” or what Ronald Judy calls “an interdiction against subjectivity.” In other words, **the Black has sentient capacity but no relational capacity**. As an accumulated and fungible object, rather than an exploited and alienated subject, the Black is openly vulnerable to the whims of the world and so is his or her cultural “production.” What does it mean—what are the stakes—when the world can whimsically transpose one’s cultural gestures, the stuff of symbolic intervention, onto another worldly good, a commodity of style? (Wilderson 2010: 56)

He continues:

The Afro-pessimists are theorists of Black positionality who share Fanon’s insistence that, though Blacks are . . . sentient beings, the structure of the entire world’s semantic field . . . is sutured by anti-Black solidarity. . . . Afropessimism explores the meaning of Blackness not—in the first instance—as a variously and unconsciously interpellated identity or as a conscious social actor, but as a structural position of noncommunicability in the face of all other positions; this meaning is noncommunicable because, again, as a position, Blackness is predicated on modalities of accumulation and fungibility, not exploitation and alienation. (58–59)

A certain kind of sociological desire is announced in this utterance, in echo not only of Fanon, not only of Patterson, but of an anticipatory counterutterance in Du Bois as well. **What is our methodological comportment in the face of the question concerning the strange meaning of being black when the ontological attitude is already under a kind of interdiction with regard to such being?** A sociology of relations that would somehow account for the radically nonrelational—but this only insofar as relationality is understood to be an expression of power, structured by the givenness of a transcendental subjectivity that the black cannot have but by which the black can be had; a structural position that he or she cannot take but by which he or she can be taken. The givenness and substantiveness of transcendental subjectivity is assured by a relative nothingness. In a relationality that can only be manifest as a general absence of relations, by way of a theoretically established noncommunicability that is, itself, somehow given for thought by way of some kind of spooky action at a distance (How else would we know this noncommunicability? How else would it show up as the nonrelationality that structures all relationality?).

## A2 sexton

**our pedagogical method is necessary to address issues like the environment, trade, and militarism that *exceed* whiteness. their representation of “whiteness” as a root cause reduces all these to products of whiteness instead of dealing with them in their full complexity.**

George **YÚDICE** Latin American & Caribbean Studies; Spanish & Portuguese Languages and Literatures; Social and Cultural Analysis @ Princeton **‘95** “Neither Impugning nor Disavowing Whiteness Does a Viable Politics Make: The Limits of Identity Politics” in *After Political Correctness* eds. Christopher Newfield and Ronald Strickland p. 279-281

It is arguments such as those of SWOP and Ganados del Valle, not simply the claim that **all we need to fight is white, Eurocentric cultural imperialism**, that have the power to incorporate the white middle and working classes into struggles led by coalitions that include people of color and that benefit the citizenry rather than capitalist corporations. Whites must feel that they have a stake in the politics of multiculturalism and not simply see themselves as a backdrop against which subordinated groups take on their identity. The question may be raised whether the rearticulation of whiteness and the incorporation of whites into struggles over resource distribution do not lead to the deconstruction of other racial and identity groupings and thus weaken the basis on which people of color in the United State" have waged their politics. **Rearticulating whiteness does not necessarily lead to a weakening of the identity of people of color and other oppressed groups**, but it does create the possibility that many more issues will be perceived no longer as exclusively "white" concerns but also as matters of importance to ethnoracially and sexually minoritized groups and vice versa. Shifting the focus of struggle from identity to. resource distribution will also make it possible to engage such seemingly nonracial issues as the environment, the military, the military-industrial complex, foreign aid, and free-trade agreements as matters impacting local identities and thus requiring a global politics that works outside of the national frame,

Of course, such a politics is meaningless unless it can be **articulated among diverse constituencie**

**s and to the location of power and capital in the state**. In City of Quartz, Mike Davis has mapped the ways in which urban ethnoracial politics and a myriad of global forces brokered by the US. state are imbricated:

The privatization of the architectural public realm, moreover, is shadowed by parallel restructurings of electronic space, as heavily policed, pay-access "information or- ders:' elite data-bases and subscription cable services appropriate part of the invisible agora. Both processes, of course, mirror the deregulation of the economy and the re- cession of non-market entitlement. 63

The erosion of public space, the bunkerization of the wealthy, the segregation of ethnoracial groups, the political economy of drugs, the expendability of youth, the absolute permeation of everyday life by consumerism from the richest to the poorest, even a religious schism between right-to-lifers (Archbishop Mohanty) and Christian liberationists (Father Olivares)----all of these phenomena are shaped by global forces that **greatly *exceed*** although they certainly do not exclude the question of whiteness. It is incumbent upon multiculturalists and identity- politics activists, if we are going to make a difference, to take our politics beyond, without **placing all the blame** on or fostering disavowal of, the **white (straw)man** at which we have aimed so many of our efforts. I CAN'T IMAGINE EVER WANTING TO BE WHITE. This statement makes me think, but it does not encourage me to imagine; in fact, it admits to a failure of the imagination. But why not imagine the cir-cumstances under which one might want to be white-or black, or brown, or queer, or none of the above?